Friday 13 January 2017

Venture capital


Introduction
Venture Capital is an institutional or private investment which addresses the funding needs of entrepreneurial business around the globe. Venture capitalists involve high risks expecting high returns from the investments. Money from venture capital is invested in a small business which could be at startup but has the potential to grow and become big companies. Experts who are involved in this kind of financing are known as venture capitalists (Bottazzi, 2008). They buy shares of the company they are interested in and become the funding partners with the business owners.
Venture capital is also known as risk capital because when investments are made, no sure knowledge exists that the investment will return the money. However, as much as it is risky, it is a profitable venture. Some institutions have been formed to pull together investors of all different capabilities called venture capital firms (Sorenson, 2001). The companies later invest the money in business giving back profits to the contributors of the venture capital.
The progress of any business relies on the availability of capital. Lenders will require collateral to secure their money. Without venture capital, businesses would not have the money to spend or expand its operations (Bottazzi, 2008). If the enterprise does not prove to be worthwhile, then funds shall not be available for the business.
Liquid
Once you involve your company into a venture capital investment, it is not easy to get out. Most of the investors are patient enough until the company or organization can issue an IPO. This is the liquidity risk premium of the initial investment in the business.
Long-term commitment
As stated earlier, most the investors in venture capital are not in a hurry to get their returns. Since they know the process of coming up with a viable business, maturing it until it develops takes time. Venture capitalists make long-term investments of their money to a maximum of five years (Madill, 2005). The potential of the profit is usually huge considering the time lag involved in the start of the business to the issue of the first IPO. Their patience is a characteristic that stands out for venture capitalists.
Difficult to determine market value
According to Madill (2005) venture capitalists do not trade their assets in active markets, it is potentially confusing to know the objective value of the investment and business. Compared to stock markets, where the market is active, it is possible to determine the actual value of the company or investments.
Limited historical risk
The fact that venture capitalists are trading in new markets and business, there is no historical data to predict the movement of capital. Lack of an active market limits the historical data on any venture that a VC would be interested.
Lack of knowledge of competitors
Since most of the business are new, it is hard to determine who else is working on the same idea or is already venturing into it. It makes it a challenge to identify the prospective competitors in the business. However, once the business has been boosted with the capital and returns start flowing in, that’s the point at which the company will note its competitors.
Vintage cycles
The economic climate of any country will determine the number of business startups. However, some years will provide better business environment than others. All these will depend on the type of market. Besides, who exits the market and when determines the pickup of the business.
            The Venture capitalists will always put their focus on major growing companies with high potentials in return on investment (Sørensen, 2007). A business plan that can elaborate the rate of investment will be at a greater advantage than others. On the other hand, a fast growing company that requires additional capital would quickly get funded because historical data shows the rich and high potential of the enterprise.
Types of venture capital
Early phase funding
Early-phase funding is categorized into several stages namely seed funding, start-up, and first phase financing,
1.      Seed funding
At this point, small portions of capital are handed to a business or entrepreneur for being eligible for the funding. These funds are usually directed to early research, and developing a business plan. Their primary aim is to finance the early development of the idea to enhance its growth (Sørensen, 2007). Also, at this stage, a company is usually not formed neither is it in operation. However, the infusion of the funds is very crucial to its development at this point. Essentially, it is at this stage that business fails because they lack the funds to carry out more market research.

2.      Startup financing
This type of venture capital will support the initial marketing and product development. It’s a fund that helps companies in operation for a short period and have not yet retailed a single product. However, these funds will finance the merchandise improvement as well as finalize on the market research.
3.      First stage
 Venture capital provided for companies that have been in the market for three years to initiate manufacturing of products and sales. They still have their services and products in testing. Once the venture capitalists see the potential, they pump in more money for the business to roll.
Expansion financing
It can be pigeon-holed as the second phase, bridge funding and third stage funding. Second-phase funding is the purpose of beginning their development. They are funded to do more research and buy out whatever is needed for the development.
Mezzanine financing or second stage mode of funding is meant for specific companies to help them expand in a major way. The role out is usually already in place, and the venture capitalists just come in to fund the process.
Bridge financing is capital provided by venture capitalists to assist a company in going public. The money acts as a link between the first IPO and expansion of the company.
Acquisition or buyout financing.
            It is money provided for a company to acquire a whole or part of a corporation. This personal finance helps a company obtain a product of another company.
Selection criteria
Ventures capitalists consider various factors before deciding to fund the business. The factors they consider will determine the eligibility if the company idea. Vetting has to be done to ensure they invest in the right business. Considering that this is a risky business, the venture capitalists like to ensure the security of their money. The following factors are considered:
Management
Management is very crucial in every business. Venture capitalists like to invest in management that will be able to run the business as well as, achieve the business plan put in place. They do not look just for a general manager, but managers who have been in the fields and can transform a small business into a big booming business. However, it’s not easy to find such managers. What determines such a criterion is the way a client presents his work. Business and companies that are looking for venture capital should be able to provide a list of executives who shall be able to carry out the managerial roles. The executive should be a panel of people who have previously made money for investors. Venture capitalists have a funny saying but holds true that says, they would rather invest in a bad idea being led by an experienced manager other than a bright and good idea being led an inexperienced manager. This saying has helped investors choose the right ideas to invest in with security of their returns.
Size of the market
The size of the market implies that the business idea has a large market which is reachable and can generate enough returns (Brander, 2002). Convincing them is an important thing because they want to put their money in the business that will pull clients thus raking in revenues of up to 1 billion dollars. They wish to ensure that their portfolio companies have a chance of growing their sales and if possible, surpass their targets. The larger the market size, the higher the chances of the business making sales and generating revenues for them. All they want is the idea to take first or second place in the market.
For successful pitching, a business plan should have a well-detailed analysis of the market and their needs (Brander, 2002). They also prefer the market sizing in a top-down or bottom-up format.  The business plan should also show responses from customers in the market that they are willing to buy the products. Such a business plan will automatically win the heart of a venture capitalist.
Excellent product with competitive edge
Investing in a good product that will eventually top the market is their other agenda. A great product is one that will sell irrespective of the market conditions, for a service, it should be one that the market requires. A problem that has not been solved before. For the products, it should be the product that the market cannot do without. Such products are easy to market and their sales easy to monitor. They also look for products that have a very high competitive advantage in the market. It’s their goal for a company they invest in to rake in revenues way before competitors get into the market. To a venture capitalist, he fewer the competitors in the market, the better for the business.
According to (2002) many are the chances that venture capitalists will fund businesses that have a monopoly because they are sure of the returns. However, a new company cannot prove monopoly but can only show its competitive advantage to get a god ahead node for funding.
Awareness of risk
Venture capitalists are risk takers but do not mean they will get into a business blindly. They have to know what they are dealing with as well as what they are getting themselves into. They also need to accesses risks involved in funding the business, more especially if it is a startup. If not, a venture capitalist would want to see the mileage and accomplishments of business before they put their money into it(Chesbrough, 2002). First, they will consider the legality of the company and ask whether any legal issues will present themselves in the course of the business.
About the product or services, they ask themselves whether the business is relevant today or will it be relevant ten years to come. Thirdly, they would also consider whether they have enough money in their funds to meet the needs of the business. If not, they will opt out of the sides. Finally, how they exit the business is crucial. Will the exit be beneficial to them or will it be a loss?
Their main aim is to reduce risks involved in business, but that will depend on the type of fund and the people who are making the investment decisions (Fried, 1994). Ventures capitalists will mitigate risks while aiming at producing significant returns from the business.
 Determinants of financial contracting between entrepreneurs and VCs
After a business proposal has been vetted by the Venture capitalist, another crucial part of the investment is the relationship of the venture capitalist and the entrepreneur (Chesbrough, 2002). This relationship is critical for it determines the success or failure of business. The financial contracting part is essential in that it allows funds to start flowing into the business. Various factors can influence the contacting part:
Amount of capital offered
Every entrepreneur would like a venture capitalist to fund the business the way he wants it. However, depending on the nature of investment, the venture capitalists can undercut the aggregate of finances required to finance the company. Such scenarios are common especially if the business is not worth such sums of money (Ueda, 2004). For an entrepreneur who is so determined to get the full capital without any cuts will probably be discouraged. In such a scenario, what will determine the type of financial contract they will sign, is the impressive capabilities of the entrepreneur. The amount offered will determine the type of contract the entrepreneur will opt for; he can reject or accept the offer depending on his taking of the undercut
Company shares
To be part and person of the company, a venture capitalist will want a share of the business so as to secure their capital. They can ask for as much as half of the business shares subject to the nature of industry. For instance, a venture capitalist who has seen a great potential in a business idea would double the amount of capital being pumped into the company for 50% of the shares (Benson, 2010). For an entrepreneur, it means he will no longer control the business as he expected; however, the lure of capital is very enticing to refuse. In such a case, the entrepreneur can opt out if he cannot give out half of his company or he can get into a financial contract to start the business immediately.
An idea is a personal possession to an entrepreneur, thus parting with a portion of it is the tricky part. The ability and capability of the entrepreneur to part with a share of his business as collateral for the venture capital will determine the type of contract they will sign.
Contract period
The contract period will affect the contract between the finance and the entrepreneur. Contract periods span from one to five years. The longer the period, the better for the entrepreneur because the amount of money being paid back is enough for the business to sustain. Unlike an entrepreneur who has to pay back the capital for one year. It will be stressful for the company as well the management of the company (Kaplan, 2003). However, venture capitalists are very considerate giving timespans for their return in investments. For instance, an entrepreneur given a span of five years to repay the capital and the business is picking up very well will have no difficulties in paying it back. On the other hand, the entrepreneur with one year for repayments will opt out because he sees it as not workable.
Conflicts of interest minimization through contracting
In their quest to make money, the venture capitalist has found themselves in the middle of conflicts. They have lost money in legal battles because of conflicts arising from contracts signed with different companies. Over time, they have come to learn the art of conflict mitigation. One way to mitigate conflict is the use of contracts. However, the mind of a person is more powerful than a computer so taking advantage of the mind by subjecting it into critical thinking to analyze the potentials of the companies to invest in. Besides, company relationship is essential in determining where to invest. The relationship between two companies should be well brought to light. The companies could be competitors or substitutes to each other. In such a scenario, wise decisions should be made to prevent a possible conflict of interest in either company.
A preferable way to mitigate the conflict of interest is by not investing in related companies like direct competitors (Hsu, 2004). There is no sense in investing money in both companies while the money is being used to bring the other company down in the market. The investments will be fighting each other, and one end will lose.
According to Ueda (2004), such a scenario happens, assuming that they are not major investments, the venture capitalist should apply the Hippocratic Oath, which means “first do no harm.” If the two companies end up competing in the same market space, the investor has to be very careful not to share any confidential information across the board. He should avoid advising them based on the privileged knowledge he has about the other company. If he does so, there will be a conflict of interest. Typically, the venture capitalists will have representatives on the boards of the two different companies. However, the representatives will excuse themselves from any discussion that involves the competitive areas of the company.
Rarely will the two parties appoint the venture capitalists to sit as a neutral arbitrator in any case and help them in coming up with solutions in a Modus vivendi. In as much as it is rare, it will be illegal to even a court battle if this comes to light. They will be slapped with a restraint of trade order which will be disastrous for the funds invested in either company.
A good example is in the case of Google and Apple. Both companies shared a board of directors thus having a close relationship (Ueda, 2004). As long as one was making computer hardware and the other operating a search engine, there was no conflict of interest, however, the moment their operation started converging and becoming similar, the two had to part ways to avoid conflicts of interest.
In order to prevent such scenarios, it is precisely stated in the contract that the company shall not put the investor in a state of conflict of interest. Likewise, for the venture capitalists, he has to sign the documents that he shall not invest in another company which poses competition to the latter company. By doing so, the venture capitalist will be liable for a court summon with intent to undermine the success of the second company. Such complications also lower the rating of the venture capitalist such that other companies would not seek funds from them for fear of being put in the cross fire with their rival companies.
Recently, it has been established that venture capitalist firms have been unwilling to sign Non-disclosure agreements with potential clients. It has made the clients feel insecure; however, the venture capitalist firms have reasons to do so. It is one of the strategies for avoiding conflicts of interest in disclosure of information. Secondly, they so to avoid enclosing themselves in a specific part of the industry sector (Bienz, 2010). If they signed a letter of Non-disclosure with a laptop company, that means they cannot support or fund any other company dealing with laptops. Also, chances are very high for an entrepreneur to sue them for the disclosure of information which will hold ground because of the contract agreement. An entrepreneur can be disappointed because of his business and decide to blame bluntly it on the venture capitalist companies. It has also come to their knowledge that non-disclosure agreements are a waste of time and money. They value their time more, and the high chances are that they assume or brush aside non-disclosure agreements. Finally, a non-disclosure agreement could bring potential harm to the firm’s reputation which the venture capitalists will avoid at all costs.
What and how post-investment services of VCs are determined/affected
A company that needs funds from venture capitalists will have to undergo an evaluation to determine the net worth of the company (Schmidt, 2003). However, the company will receive assessments which the businessperson is ready to take and which the investor willing to pay. In the evaluation, the company’s worth is determined by the price of the last share that was paid. Several factors determine the investment services offered:
Timing
Time will affect the valuation of your business or property. There are periods when the value of valuations will be higher than others (Schmidt, 2003). For example, valuation of real state in 2015 was greater than in 2009. Different cycles will affect the value of your investment, for instance, there have been more people raising money for investments across the globe thus a lower valuations value.
Relative value
A similar company that is identical to the company being valued is interrelated concerning industry, revenue growth and cost structure. Companies of similar size having similar numbers and financial will be treated equally (Bottazzi, 2008). The valuation will then be based on a revenue comparison that is multiplied. For instance, a similar company that has a revenue of 4 million and was valued at 12 million and your company has a revenue of 2 million; your income can be justified at a value of 6 million.
Auctions
If companies are interested in going for a deal, the company with the highest bid will take away the deal. In such a case the value of your company will be raised.
Seller’s desperation
If an entrepreneur is very desperate, then the price will be lower, and finally, he shall walk away with the lowest value of the company. However, if he is not desperate and the valuation does not please him, he can walk away, and the resulting action is that the price value will be raised to meet his expectation
For an entrepreneur to get funding, he must fit in the VCs model of value determination. If the client does not meet the minimum criteria, the venture capitalists will dismiss him. They consider the whether the business internal rate of return goal is suitable for them (Bottazzi, 2008). They also have to consider how much they can pay, how to get an exit and how long before exit time matures. The valuation will also be affected by the type of investor. For instance, a VC is going to give the lowest valuation for the business, and they have to deliver an IRR after which investment in the company is made by a partnership vote after agreeing on all stakes involved.
Strategic investors who have a strategic need in business will pay more or give more capital to reasonable terms than Angels or VCs. On the other hand, it is best for an entrepreneur to know that you can only control the pricing if you are in power (Bottazzi, 2008). For example, a company that is very successful and needs funding will dictate its terms on the negotiation table. Unlike a struggling firm, the deal shall be dictated to them because they have no bargaining leverage.

Devising exit strategies
Venture capitalists have two primary exit strategies in any investment. They can either exit through an initial price offer or a merger/acquisition. For the past several years there has been a small price in the initial price offers in the equity markets. As a result, the VCs are now preferring acquisitions or mergers. The rate of return on a merger is higher than an IPO. Most this merger involves a smaller company being funded by a venture capitalist merging with a large public or private company (Benson, 2010). In some cases, there is a merger between companies of the same size. In this scenario, it only ensures the survival of the company but a limited return of investments for the venture capitalist. Most big companies are having a good time when a Venture capitalist exits because they can buy the company and expand its lines of products by making the already made products their own. They take advantage if the VC money that established the product. Once a merger is done, the roles and participation of venture capitalist come to an end (Bottazzi, 2008). They can no longer be involved in any decision making.
In some cases, the venture capitalists are eager to finance the company once the contract period is over. They initiate a management buyout which is characterized by selling it to a new board of directors who will continue with the operations of the business. This type of exit involves many parties who chip in the buyout. However, it is not a preferred preference for the venture capitalists. A venture capitalist aim is to get his money back.
Schmidt (2003) states that venture capitalist know that out of 10 investments, only one will rake in major returns. So, the only way to causation themselves is by devising an exit strategy that will give them back their initial investments. Sadly, not all exits provide the initial investment a required by the VC. An excellent exit is one that is being managed by an experienced board who know what to do and what not to do.
Conclusion
Venture capitalists offer capital to new business and those that want to expand. They have their criteria they use to determine the viability of the business. Once the viability is determined, and they give it go ahead, the business is ready for funding but only after a contract is signed. However, venture capitalists have been facing challenges due to conflicts of interests and as a result, they have taken steps to caution themselves from such scenarios. Venture capitalist firms have formulated rules such as not engaging in disclosure agreements and investing in directly competing companies. While sticking to the norms of the game, they ensure there is no conflict of interest. The firm tries to protect its image and retain its customers.
Their post-investment services are determined by following criteria’s that evaluate the net worth of accompany. They present value that the company will buy, and the entrepreneur will accept. An exit strategy is essential to a VC for it protects their interests and finances. They can exit through mergers or IPOs (Schmidt, 2003). They prefer mergers because the pricing is high compared to IPOs. For any new venture that requires funding.  A venture capitalist would be a wise option to obtain financing.
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